Principles of modern cyber-physical system (CPS) analysis are based on analytical methods that depend on whether safety or liveness requirements are considered. Complexity is abstracted through different techniques, ranging from stochastic modelling to contracts. However, both distributed heuristics and Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based approaches as well as the user perspective or unpredictable effects, such as accidents or the weather, introduce enough uncertainty to warrant reinforcement-learning-based approaches. This paper compares traditional approaches in the domain of CPS modelling and analysis with the AI researcher perspective to exploring unknown complex systems.
Introduction
The notion of cyber-physical systems (CPS) describes the combination of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and software (the "cyber" part) with physical components. A CPS can emerge from embedded systems by internetworking them. The first big research program focusing on CPS has been started by the US National Science Foundation in 2006, where the term CPS is defined in as such that it "refers to the tight conjoining of and coordination between computational and physical resources," stating " [w] e envision that the cyber-physical systems of tomorrow will far exceed those of today in terms of adaptability, autonomy, efficiency, functionality, reliability, safety, and usability" [1] .
While the notion of CPS by the U.S. National Science Foundation, as outlined above, includes ICT, it does not explicitly name Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a necessary component to raise an embedded system to the status of a CPS. Yet, the availability of sensory data together with a communications system and the ability to exert actions upon the physical world that have been planned for the whole compound of embedded systems components readily suggests that issues of planning, the increase of reflectivity, efficiency, and lowering resource usage is achieved by increasing the "intelligence" of the overall system. As such, researchers in the domain of AI have found numerous application domains.
However, the two worlds of CPS and AI usually operate on different terms: CPS require operation within well-defined boundaries, i.e., as far as possible deterministic behavior within well-known, strictly enforced margins of error. In contrast, many AI techniques-Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) foremost-are firmly rooted in the domain of statistics, which is probably very well seen in the ANN training process.
There is already some history in investigating how AI can form an integral part of a high-assurance system, such as CPS typically are. This is the core of the first perspective we outline in this paper, namely, the research question of how to bring systems with AI-components whose verification is inherently difficult, such as distributed heuristics employing Multi Agent Systems (MAS) or ANNs, into the domain of CPS, where verification methods are necessary to avoid high risks in terms of costs, or even life. Examples from the power system domain are COHDA [2] or Winzent [3] - [6] that both manage real power generation and consumption schedules using a distributed approach. In the case of COHDA, the system constitutes a distributed heuristic, whereas Winzent is deterministic, but relies on ANNs for generation and consumption forecasts. Schumann and Liu [7] compiled further contributions in which the authors first revisit the robust control, then discussing in all following chapters topics such as ANN complexity analysis; control system design and test; stability, convergence, and verification; as well as anomaly detection featuring ANNs at their core. The applications range from automotive, submarine and aircraft control to power systems management and medical systems. A more recent summary, albeit focusing exclusively on the domain of highly automated vehicles, is given by Damm, Fränzle, Gerwinn, et al. [8] .
This paper is written by and for AI researchers, carefully reviewing the literature from two perspectives: First, the inclusion of AI components into CPS, outlining challenges and recent contributions, emphasizing the differences and specific requirements of the CPS domain to AI. This first aspect considers the analysis of AI techniques such as MAS or Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in the context of CPS, where the complexity in inherent statistical non-determinism of AI components need to be tamed. The second aspect turns the tables on the CPS-AI relationship and considers the increase of stability of a CPS through AI: Here, AI is used to analyze aspects in the behavior of CPS, reaching points in a complex search space of systems behavior that are hard to conquer with traditional analysis methods.
In the domain of CPS, two key types of requirements are considered: Liveness and safety requirements. The first is colloquially expressed as "something good eventually happens," whereas the mnemonic for the latter is "nothing bad ever happens." Clearly, considering those requirements, the focus rests on safety requirements with regards to AI in the context of CPS; we will honor this and touch liveness requirements rather lightly where they are connected to safety requirements.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: We give a brief introduction to the relevant fundamentals of CPS modelling and analysis in Section 2. We then describe how programs can be derived from a formal specification in Section 1. In Section 4, we provide a summary how ANNs that serve as the controller in a CPS are being tested for safety requirements. We move on to a whole-system view in Section 1 and present common simulation frameworks. Extended the topic from Deep Learning (DL) to a broad AI perspective, we take MAS into consideration in Section 1, paying specific attention to the communication between distributed systems. Finally, Section 1 outlines techniques to derive attach vectors against specific CPS and summarize recent efforts for automatic analysis of CPS through AI methods.
Analyzing Cypber-Physical Systems for Safety Requirements: A Primer
In this section, we give a brief primer on the fundamentals relevant in the context of the work at hand. It serves mainly as an introduction for scientists from other domains, most notably AI, who are not familiar with the approaches and basic assumptions of CPS analysis. Interested readers are referred to textbooks such as the one by Alur [9] .
When specifying a CPS, one needs to consider liveness and safety requirements. These two express different types of requirements, memorizable through the two sentences given in the introduction. Alur [9] gives a simple example that illustrates the difference very well. Consider a railway with two tracks, one for each direction, leading to a bridge. The bridge is narrow such that only one track fits on it, i.e., the two tracks merge at both ends of the bridge. This critical section is, of course, guarded by signals on both ends. The safety requirement of this simple system can be expressed by the following property:
Hence, two trains arriving at the west end (W) and east end (E) of the bridge must wait; thus, the safety requirement ensures that "nothing bad ever happens." However, the property does not present a solution: The two trains halt, but from the property alone, none enters the bridge. This requirement that "one train eventually enters the bridge" is expressed by the system's liveness requirements, i.e., "something good eventually happens." Notice the presence of the word "eventually," which indicates a temporal dimension to the situation that is sorely missing from the simple property above.
Any CPS does not simply come to live in the form of source code or hardware; instead, it relies on a formal specification first. Formal languages allow to express the behavior of a system. The formal specification serves as the basis to reason about the system itself and is also the ultimate tool to verify whether an actual implementation follows the intended behavior or not. One of the commonly used specification formalisms is temporal logic, specifically its variant Metric Temporal Logic (MTL). The MTL formalism consists of propositional variables, the logical operators ¬ and ∨, and the temporal modal operators U I ("ϕ until in Iψ") and S I ("ϕ since in Iψ. Here, ϕ and ψ represent any valid formula in MTL, and I denotes a temporal interval. If I is omitted, [0; ∞) is implicitly assumed. Metric Interval Temporal Logic (MITL) adds "syntactic sugar" to MTL by replacing commonly used constructs with dedicated operators. According to Ouaknine and Worrell [10] , MTL/MITL are the dominating formalism for describing real-time systems.
The task of falsifying a system is coupled with a CPS' safety requirements, i.e., "nothing bad ever happens." Obviously, if just one counterexample can be found for a specification, then the system's safety requirements are defied. Consequently, for many CPS that harbour Machine Learning (ML) components, finding inputs that yield grotesquely wrong outputs is a required, but not a simple task. Temporal logic has a long history; Øhrstrøm and Hasle [11] give a very good account in this regard.
In first-order logic, an expression over a set of variables V is evaluated with respect to the valuation for V . In temporal logic, a formula ϕ is valuated with respect to an infinite sequence of valuations over V . The problem of checking whether a given model and its behavior satisfies its specification expressed in temporal logic by at least one formula ϕ is called model checking. Model checking has been developed independently by Clarke and Emerson (the book by Clarke Jr, Grumberg, Kroening, et al. [12] is an integral part of the standard literature corpus in this field), and Queille and Sifakis [13] , [14] in the early 1980s. When checking for safety requirements, one tries to falsify, i.e., find a valuation for which the model and specification differ. Obviously, only one such case is enough to defy a CPS' safety requirements. Algorithmic falsification techniques have been implemented, employing stochastic search strategies and nonlinear optimization methods. These pieces of software, such as Breach [15] , S-TaLiRo [16] , C2E2 [17] , and RRT-REX [18] are mostly the basis or baseline for novel approaches presented in Section 4.
Until now, we have assumed that the specification and the model-or even the system-already exist. Considering green-field projects, this isn't the case, of course. Then, one usually starts out by sketching the requirements. An earlier publication by Clarke and Emerson [19] considers the process of arriving at a program expressed as a flowchart. Finally, to follow the line of thought further, the specification itself must be correct. Checking theorems for their correctness is called theorem proving. Employing programs for this, i.e., enabling automated theory proving, has a long history-being essentially based on the works by Aristotle, Frege [20] - [22] , Russell and Whitehead [23] , and Skolem and Löwenhein [24] , [25] -and has made enormous advances in the past years, being now routinely employed in the industry. E.g., the Intel Pentium FDIV bug [26] has firmly established automated theorem proving in the CPU industry. Examples for concrete implementations come from Gordon and Melham [27] , utilizing higher-order logic, and Owre, Rushby, and Shankar [28] . An in-depth overview and examples are offered by Kaufmann, Manolios, and Moore [29] .
In checking all stages of the design process, from creating the model, deriving the implementation, checking the implementation's requirements and finally monitoring its behavior during runtime, one tries to achieve end-to-end correctness of the CPS. There is no fixed recipe for all steps; Desai, Dreossi, and Seshia [30] present a not too old approach from traditional CPS design where ML does explicitly not form an integral part of the CPS, which is why it is exactly a good example in this regard. The example the authors present is a surveillance drone that patrols a fixed route via waypoints. In their approach, the (reactive) robotics software is first tested via model checking. Then, the safety requirements are noted in Signal Temporal Logic (STL) and verified to hold continuously at runtime.
Another factor that makes the previously mentioned publication a good example is the programming language the authors employ for the software: P. Presented by Desai, Jackson, and Zufferey [31] , its main paradigms are asynchronous control flow that is event-driven. As textbooks about CPS usually explain in the very first chapters, those systems are reactive-probably one of the major paradigm gaps between the two domains, CPS and AI, since a major part of the latter strives to develop proactive systems.
Seshia, Sadigh, and Sastry [32] bring this difference to the point, emphasizing that the concept of verified AI that would fit the CPS domain would have "strong, ideally provable, assurances of correctness with respect to mathematicallyspecified requirements," while ML methods and models such as DNNs that are being trained with "millions of data points" can exhibit close to stochastic behavior. The authors argue that bridging this gap can be done through training and test data generation. The focus on data and how it interacts with ML models is further deepened in Section 1.
Synthesis Methods
Considering the previous section, it becomes obvious that reasoning about a CPS involves a formal specification as well as a program that follows it. The specification is a high-level description of what the final system should do and ideally, the implementation in hard-and software follows this specification. Bridging these two levels of abstraction poses not one, but two questions: First, does a piece of software that was written according to a specification match the intended behavior expressed by this specification in all cases? And second, is there instead a way to generate a program that complies with the high-level specification? Formal synthesis is the latter process, i.e., generating a program from a high-level specification.
Jha and Seshia [33] present a framework in this regard that combines ML and formal synthesis, i.e., a framework in inductive synthesis. Inductive synthesis-described, e.g., in by Gold [34] , Shapiro [35] , and Summers [36] -seeks to find a program that matches a set of input/output pairs. At high level, inductive synthesis is an instance of learning from examples, commonly known also as inductive inference or machine learning. This connection can be deduced very easily from the works of Angluin and Smith [37] , and Russell and Norvig [38] . The framework proposed treats the synthesis as a problem of language learning. However, Jha and Seshia [33] also clearly note the differences between a program synthesis and the usual ML approach, which manifests itself not just in concept classes the learning algorithms are applied to, but specifically in the difference of exact learning and approximate learning. The latter is the typical ML task, where driving the training error down to zero is often not necessary or even not desirable (as it would indicate overfitting), whereas a program synthesis cannot get away with being a correct program 98% of the time.
Another aspect of synthesis methods is parameter synthesis. In this case, a formal description exists, e.g., in STL, as well as a model, but the STL formulae lack concrete signal or time values. This means that the general behavior of a system is known, but threshold or critical values are not. Jin, Donzé, Deshmukh, et al. [39] propose an algorithm to mine requirements from closed-loop control models, in which the inputs to their algorithm is the plant model as well as a requirement template expressed in parametric STL. The algorithm guarantees a tight formulation of the parameters, i.e., parameter values are as close to the actual limits of the system as possible. The overall approach is helpful to, e.g., validate future versions of the CPS.
Neural Control Falsification
Neural control describes a CPS in which an ANN takes the role of a controller, replacing a complex traditional controller, such as a closed-loop system. Their falsification is based on the system's safety requirements, i.e., the part expressing that "nothing bad every happens." Consequently, one counterexample defies this, which is ultimately the goal of any falsification technique. Whatever "bad" means is dependent on the actual system and the world it is being deployed in; in an Autonomous Vehicle (AV), this can range from the misclassification of an object or human being to an actual collision.
When an ANN is used as a controller, problems of Adversarial Learning (AL), as they are studied in the domain of AI, of course also apply to the use ANNs as controllers in CPS. In AL, an adversarial sample constitutes a sample that is presented to an ML and that features only minimal perturbation compared to a legitimate sample, but causes the ML model to exhibit a starkly wrong result. Well-known examples of AL have been observed in e-mails in the early days of spam filtering, where a blacklisted word such as viagra was modified to read víâg R á and therefore still readable to humans as the same word, but caused to offending e-mail to escape spam filters. The problem emerges especially in the domain of deep learning, where complex ANNs can, e.g., misclassify images when only a minimal amount of RGB noise is added to the picture.
The foundation of computer vision that is prominently used for AVs are Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). Although they have a long history and automatic training with backpropagation of error has been shown by LeCun, Boser, Denker, et al. [40] in 1989, only the advent of General-Purpose Graphics Processing Units (GPGPUs) have made effective training possible. The well-documented work by Cireşan, Meier, Gambardella, et al. [41] marks one of the major achievements in this regard. However, effective adversarial samples have been quickly found; an impressive account has been made by Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune [42] . Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy [43] offer an in-depth explanation of AL in the context of DL, arguing that the primary reason for the effectiveness of adversarial samples is the linear nature of certain ANNs.
Recently, researchers have worked on methods to test ANNs against adversarial examples, both with and without knowledge of the neural network's inner structure. Papernot, McDaniel, Goodfellow, et al. [44] thoroughly demonstrate practical black-box attacks after previously noting the general limitations of DL in adversarial settings [45] . Chen, Zhang, Sharma, et al. [46] recount how black-box attacks use substitute models trained on the target ANN, exploiting the fact that adversarial samples (e.g., adversarial images) are highly transferable. In their paper, the authors then employ zeroth order optimization methods to directly estimate the gradients of the target model to effectively generate adversarial samples without needing a substitute model.
Where black-box testing of ANNs assumes no prior knowledge of the networks themselves, white-box tests specifically trace the activation of neurons given certain inputs in order to derive minimal changes to valid samples to arrive at adversarial samples. With DeepXplore, one of the first frameworks for white-box testing of DL ANNs, Pei, Cao, Yang, et al. [47] present a framework that introduces neuron coverage to measure the activation of parts of the ANN in order to then derive adversarial samples. Manual testing of correct or incorrect behavior of the overall system is achieved by cross-linking oracles, which, in this case, are other DL systems with similar functionality. In this work, deriving adversarial samples with high neuron coverage is represented as optimization problem that is subject to efficient gradient-descent methods. DeepXplore has already been the basis for several CPS-specific frameworks, such as DeepTest by Tian, Pei, Jana, et al. [48] that aims at testing AVs driven by DNNs.
With AI 2 , Gehr, Mirman, Drachsler-Cohen, et al. [49] propose a sound analyzer for DNNs. The key building block is the transformation of operations in the ANN to conditional affine transformations, i.e., affine transformations guarded by logical constraints. This allows to treat the elements of the DNN in abstract domains such that property verification, specifically of robustness properties, is possible. As reasoning of robustness and safety properties of ANNs is enabled through AI 2 , this bridges the world of ANNs and classic abstract reasoning of CPS. One side effect of the proposed methodology is the restriction of AI 2 to only certain kinds of activation functions and network layouts, namely ReLU, max pooling, and convolutional layers that make a feed-forward/convolutional neural network.
All white-box falsification methods currently attack feed-forward ANNs, with CNNs being a variant thereof. This makes sense, considering that CNNs find application in the computer vision discipline, where CNNs are currently the best structure for image/object classification. With Capsule Networks that differ from CNNs especially through their dynamic routing concept between capsules, Sabour, Frosst, and Hinton [50] have proposed a ANN architecture that addresses some of the shortcomings of CNNs, e.g., that a CNN happily detects a normal human face even if the eyes are located on the chin. However, capsule networks still cannot be efficiently trained; but of course, this is being worked on [51] , [52] . Another reason for tackling feed-forward networks first is the inherent complexity of other ANN architectures: Feed-forward networks approximate any Borel-measurable function; for this claim exist no less than three proofs, the most often cited ones being developed by Hornik, Stinchcombe, and White [53] , and Cybenko [54] .
In between white-and black-box testing is gray-box testing, in which some knowledge of the underlying model is assumed to be known, but no full analytical coverage is desired. Dreossi, Donzé, and Seshia [55] develop a hybrid, gray-box approach, assuming some internal knowledge of the ML components within the CPS. The authors assume these components to be classifiers, specifically binary classifiers, rightfully implying that any multi-class classifier can be turned into a binary classifier without loss of generality. The two parts-the CPS specified in STL, and the ML component-are then separately analyzed. Then, they assume a variant of the CPS model M the authors denote with M + , in which the ML component is perfect. From this point, considering only the CPS component described by the STL formula ϕ, the two sets of inputs to M + U + ϕ and U + ¬ϕ are computed. The second part of the falsification engine then tries to identify inputs contained in U + ϕ for which the ML component fails. The ML classifier is replaced by a simpler approximation operating on an abstracted feature space; sampling of the desired points from the thus simplified feature space is done with quasi-Monte Carlo techniques building on the discrepancy notion from equidistribution theory [56] , [57] . The authors' case study utilizes the Unity-Udacity AV simulator in which a CNN needs to detect a cow and initiate emergency braking.
In a similar vein, Yaghoubi and Fainekos [58] present a state-of-the-art, effective framework in this regard. Additionally to the black-box approach of knowing inputs and outputs, they extract dynamic model linearizations along the systems' trajectories, arguing that this kind of information is readily available via, e.g., the Simulink linear analysis toolbox anyways. This linearization around the trajectories is used to apply gradient descent in order to yield a valid input similar to the original one, but with a negative robustness value, i.e., the falsification. The input search space is not constraint by this approach, which is a further advantage. The authors claim that their framework outperforms black-box system testing methods, showing in case studies shorter times to falsification as well as consistently finding falsifications where the methods chosen for comparison fail. In their experimental results, they choose uniform random sampling and simulated annealing implementations of S-TaLiRo [16] the baseline to beat. Sadly, black-box testing methods such as the previously discussed one by Chen, Zhang, Sharma, et al. [46] , a comparison with approach by Dreossi, Donzé, and Seshia [55] -which the authors explicitly cite-, or even white-box testing methods, are absent from the case studies.
The most striking difference between the two frameworks by Dreossi, Donzé, and Seshia [55] , and Yaghoubi and Fainekos [58] lies in utilizing ideas from optimal control theory [58] - [61] , meaning that the frameworks consider system-level building blocks instead of only the controlling ANN. An advantage of this approach in comparison to DeepXplore, AI 2 , and similar white-box methods, however, is their framework's ability to falsify Recurrent Neural [67] , and Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) [66] . The second aspect calls on the notion of the digital twin, i.e., "a dynamic virtual representation of a physical object or system across its lifecycle, using real-time data to enable understanding, learning and reasoning," according to Bolton, McCollKennedy, Cheung, et al. [68] . This idea specifically enables Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL), which has become a huge topic of interest since the hallmark publication of Mnih, Kavukcuoglu, Silver, et al. [69] . Clearly, the "trial and error" approach of RL calls for a simulation model in the context of critical CPS. Finally, the Differentiable Neural Computer (DNC), proposed by Graves, Wayne, Reynolds, et al. [70] , with an RNN serving as a controller in a differentiable Von-Neumann architecture with external memory, promises to approximate algorithms, further widening the capabilities of DL modules that will find their way into CPS.
Simulation-based Testing Frameworks
Once the environment becomes increasingly complex, analytical methods as mentioned in the previous sections fall short in providing real-world, i.e., realistic inputs. While the methods mentioned in Section 4 can be used to derive inputs that falsify a model, they are not necessarily guaranteed to actually appear in a production environment. Consider an autonomous vehicle as the CPS: Another car flying upside down from one building to another might certainly trigger a wrong driving decision by the neural controller, but are not very likely to be perceived in a real-world environment.
In this regard, Tuncali, Fainekos, Ito, et al.
[71] propose simulation-based generation of adversarial samples. In contrast to traditional synthesis or verification methods, in which an understanding of the system exists and is expressed by, e.g., STL or contracts, simulation-based analysis treats the CPS as black-box model. The authors describe methods to pertubate testing scenario parameter configurations, i.e., they seek to find scenarios that lead to unexpected behavior. Their research is motivated by the status quo of ANN verification that is only very limitedly possible as ANNs correspond to complex nonlinear and non-convex functions. Even though the generation of adversarial examples is studied intensively, the authors explain that simulation-based generation of adversarial samples constitutes a similar problem in the name only: AL, as it is studied in the domain of deep learning, focuses on one ANN and therefore deals with the falsification of an ANN at component level, whereas the proposed simulation-based approach is a falsification approach at system level, where the ANN is just one component in a complex CPS.
Kelly and Rodionova [72] argue that a simulation might work with synthetic data or variations on the simulation scenario configuration, but that this still leaves an enormous search space in which realistic situations represent only a smaller portion of the overall data. They add that collisions or blandly wrong decisions by a neural network controller are interesting, but far more often dangerous or "near-miss" situations in an AV driving scenario are just as interesting, but harder to detect. The authors acknowledge that sophisticated world simulators are necessary to provide the AV's perception pipeline with realistic data and, based on this, incorporate the video game Grand Theft Auto V into their simulator as the world in which the AV is driving. Their approach also differs in that the simulator does not explicitly force dangerous situations, but instead tries to log sufficient miles for an expressive test.
In general, pertinent literature stresses that not the software, but the model of the simulated world is the major challenge in any simulation task. Lobao and Porto [73] , and Robinson [74] , [75] specifically argue how, as scope and complexity of the model increase, model confidence and even accuracy finally decrease. CPS, with a combination of different domains, are also prone to suffer from another problem with regards to simulation: There is no single simulation software that covers multiple domains. An ICT simulator cannot cover the intricacies of simulating a power system or present the perception pipeline of an AV with realistic images. To address this problem, co-simulation is a viable approach. It assumes that the best possible course is to couple domain-specific simulators, synchronizing them and allowing them to exchange data. Gomes, Thule, Broman, et al. [76] offer a more detailed argumentation and description of the specific challenges; Nguyen, Besanger, Tran, et al. [77] and Palensky, Van Der Meer, Lopez, et al. [78] focus on the specifics of co-simulation in the power systems domain.
With regards to software that facilitates co-simulation, radically different approaches exist. On the simpler end of the spectrum, we can note mosaik [79] . It synchronizes simulators on a request-response communication schema, acting as a "data kraken" in which the experimenter connects communicating models from different simulators via the attributes they announce to mosaik; requesting data on a time step using the get_data method and delivering data prior to executing a time step using the step method. mosaik is, therefore, agnostic to the inner workings of simulators or their models. In contrast, Ptolemy II [80] focuses not just on simulation, but also on modeling and design of concurrent components. Including techniques such as actor-driven execution, Ptolemy II is a grey-box co-simulation approach where mosaik treats all simulators as black boxes, requesting only compliance to the communication protocol as the smallest common denominator.
Besides concrete implementations, co-simulation can be governed by a standard for support both model exchange and co-simulation of dynamic models. The Functional Mock-Up Interface (FMI) [81] uses a combination of eXtensible Markup Language (XML) documents and generated C code to bridge different simulators without forcing a particular toolset or execution scheme. A good illustration how extensive co-simulation can be employed in the context of AVs as CPS is provided by the key findings document of the ENABLE-S3 EU research project [82] .
Multi Agent Systems and Deterministic Communication in Cyber-Physical Systems
The perspective of AI has, until now, been very much focused on ML, giving much space to DL models. Obviously, this is too narrow: Russell and Norvig [38] describe AI in terms of rational agents, or, more broadly, "intelligent entities" that learn, solve problems, and act based on their own goals and model of their environment. This is, considering standard works such as the textbook by Wooldridge [83] , where they ultimately distinguish themselves from the classical CPS software: While the latter is always reactive, agents are, except for the simplest forms, proactive, meaning that they act, with a specific level of autonomy, towards a goal or to maximize a utility function regardless of whether they receive input from their environment or not. Together with the uncertainty of ML models, this proactiveness provides for the next stark contrast to the traditional CPS domain. Additionally, many agent designs introduce a social component: There is not one, but several agents, collaborating through a communication protocol, evolving it to a MAS. From the perspective of a CPS, a better-and more specific-name is that of agent-based control systems, combining both aspects, that of autonomy and that of exerting control over physical components [84] .
While the basic assumptions of the different domains seem to contradict each other, the Divide-et-Impera approach computer science inheres in appeals to tackle complex problems even in critical infrastructures and CPS. Examples include the aforementioned Universal Smart Grid Agent [5] , designs by Nieße, Lehnhoff, Tröschel, et al. [85] and Schwerdfeger and Westermann [86] , where ancillary services, including frequency control, are provided for power grids through MAS, as well as an earlier summary by McArthur, Davidson, Catterson, et al. [87] , [88] , crossing to other domains such as autonomous driving, where Dresner and Stone [89] employ a MAS for traffic management at intersections, or Hallé and Chaib-draa [90] present a collaborative driving system modelled through a MAS. When we assume that the previous paragraphs cover the internals of each agent, what defines the overall behavior of the MAS is their communication, being the agents' protocol from the sense of data encoding as well as a behavioral protocol. ICT protocols are usually far from being deterministic; the analysis of Veres and Boda [91] in terms of the stochastic nature of the congestion control algorithm of the well-known Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) may serve as a pars-pro-toto example.
In general, the divide-et-impera approach of MAS lets the foundation of distributed computing surface: consensus problems. This is not solely related to agents with their proactive behavior based on goals or utility functions; problems such as distributed timekeeping and distributed snapshotting with classical publications by Chandy and Lamport [92] and Mattern [93] are well known. In this understanding, software agents constitute the technical realization of distributed algorithms, paving the way for a more integrated view on distributed systems and AI. Reaching consensusi.e., the question of convergence of a protocol-becomes more difficult to reason compared to locally running algorithms due to the distributed nature of an MAS, where time delays in transmission are not deterministic. Olfati-Saber, Fax, and Murray [94] provide a valuable review of newer consensus and cooperation protocols as well as ways to model consensus as control loops and using graph theory to qualitatively and quantitatively determine convergence. Eventual convergence is obviously not guaranteed; Hanachi and Sibertin-Blanc [95] and Matt, Toni, and Dionysiou [96] show the non-trivial nature of convergence. Convergence is still different from making sure that a deal is always possible, as Faratin, Sierra, and Jennings [97] state.
One of the ancestral behavioral protocols for MAS is the Contract Net Protcol by Smith [98] . Here, agents announce tasks using broadcast messages for other agents to bid on. The announcement also contains the ranking process, i.e., bids delivered by other agents are ranked according to metrics such as estimated time to task completion. The announcer, or task manager, then awards the task to a specific node, informing all other nodes in the process. The awarded node can then additionally choose to break the task up into smaller subtasks and sub-contract them through a similar procedure.
The general broadcast-bidding-awarding structure of behavior laid down in the Contract Net Procol has influenced many (negotiation) protocols for distributed computation. In many cases, additional ideas are brought in to add efficiency, to speed up the negotiation, or to reduce the amount of messages or data being sent. The Lightweight Power Exchange Protocol (LPEP) [3] , [5] specifies initial messages (requests for or offers of power) as broadcasts, but models the overlay networks the agents use on the power grid in which the agents' physical entities represent, imposing rules on message routing that limit message propagation, introducing the concept of dynamic neighborhoods where supply and demand have as little physical line meter between them as possible, reducing the line loss. Responses are routed directly through a dynamic routing table on each node that is being built during the request stage.
Additionally, Shen and Norrie [99] worked towards eschewing the initial broadcast stage. They employ multicastingi.e., the network protocol concept [100] -for the task announcement messages, creating interest groups to which agents can subscribe. Wanyama and Homayoun Far [101] reduce the number of negotiation rounds until consensus is reached, limiting the scope of agent coalitions to a group-choice problem and basing their negotiation approach on game theory, replacing explicit knowledge through message exchanges by implicit knowledge coming from a gametheoretic model of the negotiation process. Garcia, Cao, and Casbeer [102] have reduced the number of messages per negotiation, assuming a control theory problem behind the agents' communication and implementing an asynchronous, event-based protocol based on a discretized model that is decoupled from the state of the agent's neighbors.
The aforementioned publication by Olfati-Saber, Fax, and Murray [94] also emphasizes the effectiveness of neighborhood concepts, based on small-world networks by Watts and Strogatz [103] -being one of the hallmark works on overlay topologies for distributed computing-, and referring to the weightings introduced by Xiao and Boyd [104] . The two works heavily influenced the later, much-celebrated small-world model for MAS by Olfati-Saber [105] . The COHDA protocol by Hinrichs, Lehnhoff, and Sonnenschein [2] builds on the small-world model; Nieße, Bremer, and Lehnhoff [106] also note that fast convergence or the quantitative guarantee of convergence do not necessarily mean that the optimal solution to a problem is found, but that the ICT overlay network topology influences the search for a solution with certain MAS protocols.
In the context of a CPS, fully decentralized MAS approaches to a problem can be viewed with suspicion. After all, there is no way to control or "look into" the process as it happens. The statement of the convergence problem by Hanachi and Sibertin-Blanc [95] mentioned above is approached by the authors through a protocol moderator, i.e., an explicit middleman. Similarly, for COHDA, Nieße and Tröschel [107] propose an observer-controller architecture for the in its core completely decentralized protocol. The questions these approaches rise is whether how certain behavior can be formulated as being expected, rather than just exhibited. It is expressed in the move from specifications to contracts in component design. The idea of contracts has been and applied by Meyer [108] in his famous and influencing Eiffel programming language, where a class-in the sense of object-oriented programming-is considered an invariant and a class' methods are extended with preconditions and postconditions state predicates. As long as the preconditions hold, a method's contracts with the outside world are fulfilled; when the method's postconditions hold, the method fulfills the contracts the rest of the world expects from it. As such, a contract is a component model specifying what the component expects from its environment, and the ensuing promises guaranteed by the component under correct use. The ideas implemented in Eiffel root in seminal work by Dijkstra [109] and Lamport [110] (weakest preconditions and predicate transformers); the books by Back and Wright [111] and Back and Wright [112] are probably the standard works for reasoning about discrete, untimed process behavior: The refinement calculus describes processes operating on shared variables using guarded commands.
Dill [113] describes a model based on behaviors exhibited by a component, called traces, that is asynchronous in nature. It has been extended to a discrete synchronous model by Dill [114] ; De Alfaro and Henzinger [115] have proposed a concept similar to synchronous trace structures, called interface automata, which has later seen extension to resources and asynchronous behaviors. Process spaces, developed by Negulescu [116] , and the agent algebra by Passerone and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli [117] offer a more general approach to generic behaviors and draw heavily from the algebraic approach by Burch, Passerone, and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli [118] . Note that the term "agent" in the agent algebra is, "[. . . ] a generic term that includes software processes, hardware circuits and physical components, and abstractions thereof," [117] i.e., not necessarily an autonomous software agent in line with the descriptions of the previous paragraphs. Nevertheless, the extensive theory of the agent algebra is valuable in this regard.
Obviously, the notion of "expectations from the environment" and ensuing "guarantees to the environment, given the expectations are met" are extremely valuable to reason about components, specifically distributed components, such as a MAS provides. Generally, especially since agents can form coalitions (i.e., aggregate and disaggregate dynamically), contracts based on such dynamic components are hard to formulate. Vokřínek, Bíba, Hodík, et al. [119] propose a protocol that includes checking for contract compliance and evaluating the overall performance of the contractor. They include the concept of penalties for contractors into the protocol, making penalties dynamic as part of the bidding process. Realizing that executing a contract cannot be enforced without implying a specific reason-the node may become offline due to a failure as well as being malicious-the authors do not specify what penalties are, or what the result of a penalty is. I.e., there is no "penalty announcement" to other nodes that would affect further biddings between the contractor and a different contractee. However, developing such a social dynamic in MAS with all their implications is no simple task; specifically since one must realize that this are ex post mechanisms, i.e., the damage is already done when these mechanisms are set in motion. Huynh, Jennings, and Shadbolt [120] and Schmidt, Steele, Dillon, et al. [121] propose trust models for MAS that try to take initial mistrust into account. However, this may not be enough for not violating any safety requirement; additionally, a hitherto fully trustworthy node may fail even though it has a high trust score (e.g., due to an outage).
Deriving Attack Vectors on Cyber-Physical Systems
Even when a CPS is hardened against adversarial inputs, this does not necessarily mean that an actual attack is considered. Remember that adversarial inputs are, in general, any input that foils the model into emitting a wrong response, such as a misclassification of an image. Adversarial inputs are not per se malicious, but can constitute such input or a modified input that triggers false behavior. E.g., Dodge and Karam [122] analyze the effects of image quality on DNNs; but JPEG compression artifacts do not necessarily constitute an attack on the model.
In a twist of the AL concept, attacks can be staged against the communication, the very nerves of a CPS. This is not only limited to exploiting bugs in the implementation of protocols, such as parsers; testing of this lower level of an agent's communication stack can be done using fuzzers-the work by Gorbunov and Rosenbloom [123] can be seen as exemplary of this-, but extends to crafting datagrams that are valid, but expose logic errors or other unwanted behavior in an MAS. Further, the difference between bad data injection and AL in general lies in the target: AL specifically targets an ANN serving as controller, taking the idiosyncrasies of the ML aspect into account. Bad data injection considers the whole CPS, trying to fool traditional status monitoring mechanisms that usually serve as the most trusted input to CPS' controller. For this to work, the exact domain of the CPS must be known; in contrast to the AL aspect, that targets the ANN controller, but can otherwise remain agnostic to the domain-specific parts of the actual CPS, bad data injections works because it targets the exact behavior and inner workings of the monitoring devices. Works that study this kind of malicious attack are largely based on analyses of undetectable errors-and not attacks-in otherwise legitimate CPS states, such as those Clements, Krumpholz, and Davis [124] and Wu and Liu [125] discuss. One of the basic findings in this regard, shown, e.g., by Sandberg, Teixeira, and Johansson [126] , is that an attacker has to compromise more readings than just the one she targets.
Specifically, Teixeira, Amin, Sandberg, et al. [127] analyze bad data injection in the context of cyber security of power grid state estimators. The specific goal is to inject such data that the state estimation algorithm still converges, i.e., the data must appear to be meaningful-specifics on state estimation algorithms and their convergence behavior can be found in textbooks such as the one by Abur and Exposito [128] , as well as publications targeting the apparent convergence problems such as the neural state estimation approach by Manitsas, Singh, Pal, et al. [129] -, and thus the attack remains stealthy. A successful attack diverges the thus assumed state awareness from the actual state of the power grid. In contrast to an earlier publication by Liu, Ning, and Reiter [130] , the authors can relax the attacker knowledge required to only partial or even outdated knowledge about the power grid, which can be obtained from the data some Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) send to the control center using statistical models. Teixeira, Amin, Sandberg, et al. [127] give an analytical margin on the amount of knowledge the attacker needs for a successful injection. How attacks on a CPS need only partial information about the CPS itself is demonstrated by Ju and Lin [131] . Here, the authors assume that an attacker has gained control over a generator, such as a wind turbine or Photovoltaic (PV) plant. The attacker's goal is to inflict damage by leveraging the reactive power control mechanisms present in any medium voltage grid. To this end, she only needs the general knowledge of the control rules for reactive power injection or consumption, which is very easy to come by. The attack works with distributed generators and explicitly without knowledge of the power grid's layout or other assets present in the grid. Specifically, she also does not need to compromise the communication between nodes, an aspect the other works referenced in the previous paragraphs focus on as premise for the attack to work. The authors show analytically that damage through voltage disruption based on twice the available reactive power available can be inflicted by the attacker with nearly no knowledge.
Gao, Xie, Solar-Lezama, et al. [132] also provide an approach for automated vulnerability analysis of state estimators. This one, too, is based on false data injection and considers stealthy attacks. It differs from the investigation by Teixeira, Amin, Sandberg, et al. [127] through the approach, as it encodes the problem as logic-based vulnerability analysis, presenting an approach called symbolic propagation to allow successful attacks from only a localized set of nodes. The authors use satisfiability modulo theory solvers to attack the thusly formulated problem.
Interestingly enough, these two publications-or others in the same vein-, although they assume traditional state estimators, are a variant on fooling controllers through the input data presented to them. Recall that ANNs can approximate functions and RNNs dynamic systems, approaches to replace traditional state estimators with ANNs are obvious, with one of the more recent examples coming from Manitsas, Singh, Pal, et al. [129] . These approaches are susceptible to their very own form of AL, i.e., also suffer from bad data injection. Hu, Wang, Han, et al. [133] offer a recent description of this problem. Countermeasures are being taken, ironically, not by hardening the ANN themselves, as the authors of the publications discussed in the previous Section 1 have tried to do, but by using other ANNs to detect the attack. He, Mendis, and Wei [134] promise real-time detection of false data injection using a DNN; Mousavian, Valenzuela, and Wang [135] and Abbaspour, Yen, Noei, et al. [136] undertake a similar endeavor, differing only in the type of network and data encoding they use.
CPS are not purely technical, but almost always have an economical perspective. For the power grid, markets and pricing schemes exist that can subject to exploitation. In this perspective, the attack is not motivated by the goal to physically destroy a piece of infrastructure, but by maximizing profits. Not necessarily is this entailed by a mere violation of the rules; market design is complex enough that a businessman can stage an exploit by following the rules by the letter instead of by intent. In this regard, Hirth and Schlecht [137] show how a zonal redispatch market-such as the model Germany employs-can be gamed. In this market model based on zones (e.g., north and south), congestion can lead to redispatch of generation or consumption. If, by the merit order principle, a power plant in the north zone would normally supply power, but cannot, because the link between the north and south zones is congested (i.e., the physical line would be loaded beyond the physical safety limit), the generation is redispatched to the south, meaning that a more expensive power plant in the south zone supplies the power needed and the redispatched power plant in the north zone receives a compensation for foregone profits. Using AI-based prediction, a power plant operator can predict redispatch beforehand and enter the initial bidding phase with much lower variable costs, betting on first awarded the contract to generate money while also predicting the redispatch to receive the compensation instead of generating at a loss. This specific form of economic attack is called inc-dec gaming. Similar observations have been made for Great Britain by Konstantinidis and Strbac [138] .
Ju and Lin [131] have shown that very little knowledge of the power grid as specific CPS is needed to attack it; however, the attacker still requires the minimal knowledge of the CPS itself as well as the reactive power injection control rule, i.e., minimal domain-specific knowledge. The concept of Adversarial Resilience Learning (ARL) by Fischer, Memmen, Veith, et al. [139] goes beyond specific CPS domains in that it does not require domain-specific knowledge, but only a minimal description of sensors and actuators of an agent, where minimal means the mathematical description of the observation or action space, respectively, such as "discrete 1, 2, . . . , 10" or "continuous [0; 1]". In ARL, attacker and defender agents work against each other-but without knowledge of their respective counterpart-on a shared model of a CPS, training each other in the process. The attacker tries to de-stabilize the CPS (where the notion of stability is up to the experimenter to define), whereas the defender tries to ensure a resilient operation of the CPS. Over time, the attacker finds attack vectors, whereas the defender learns strategies to keep the CPS operational. This is the second distinguishing feature of ARL, in that it provides not only analysis through the attacker, but also tries to produce a operation strategy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a literature review of techniques for CPS design and analysis, beginning with the basics of temporal logic and requirements that serve to formally specify the CPS' components at hand. We have touched methods for program synthesis, i.e., ways to generate programs from a formal specification. We have then extensively covered the use of ANNs as controllers, e.g., as replacements for classical control loops, and how falsification is applied to cover the safety requirements of a CPS. We have seen that DL has great potential, but also increases the uncertainty of such systems considerably. Going from component to system level, we have covered simulation frameworks for CPS. Afterwards, we have broadened the perspective, and included MAS as communicating, distributed problemsolvers that nowadays not only can, but do control vast CPS. Finally, we have considered attack vectors in terms of malicious actions against a CPS.
Obviously, AI research in perspective of CPS introduces much uncertainty and often breaks the required rigid assertion of liveness and, especially, safety requirements in this domain. The benefits make the risk beneficial, can by no means eschew the need for developing assertion methods towards a verified AI. We also believe that reversing the situation and putting AI to use to analyse a CPS for its safety requirements, even without CPS domain knowledge required, will provide a valuable path for a beneficial collaboration of the two research domains.
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